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Abstract 
Institutions play a fundamental role in shaping the working life pattern of dependent labor. In the years 
of the great recession started in 2008, firms struggled to adopt more flexible contracts, in Italy and 
elsewhere, to minimize the burden of labor costs and face the ups and downs of global and local 
market demand. Governments in Italy progressively adopted innovative types of contractual 
agreements to fight long-term unemployment and facilitate the matching between historically 
disadvantaged labor seekers (young and women) and firms. So short-term types of contracts became an 
important instrument to introduce flexibility in the labor market. The SILER database collects the 
obligatory communications that an employer in Italy must make to a special office when starting a 
contract with a new employee. The communication contains information on the employee, on the type 
of job and sector. Another communication must be sent when the contract ends, as well when major 
changes in the contractual terms arise. By collecting all the information for each single worker through 
many years, it is possible to reconstruct workers’ career, with the length of contracts, types of contract, 
and so on. The data allow for testing the efficacy of the flexisecurity model in Italy, as it can be 
evaluated if people can find a job without facing long periods of unemployment, even when the 
contracts offered are not permanent. Moreover, with some degree of approximation, it becomes 
possible to tell exactly the length of time existing between a contract and another, a very good proxy 
for the length of unemployment. Section 1 contains the key elements in the institutional panorama 
featuring the labor market in Italy in recent years and the evidence suggested by the ESS data 
concerning individuals’ perception of their own working life. Section 2 presents some insights from the 
relevant literature themes. Section 3 contains a description of the SILER database. Section 4 contains a 
quantitative analysis of people having a dependent labor contract in Emilia Romagna from at least 2008 
onwards. This includes computing the distribution of the most commonly adopted contracts by age, 
sex, industry and institutional type of contract, as well as the typical sequence of contractual forms for 
workers considered. Section 5 concludes and illustrates the opportunities offered by further analyses, as 
to shed more light on the stepping stone hypothesis, the behaviour of firms in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis, the role of major labor market institutional changes. 
Keywords: dependent labor, labor market institutions, careers analysis 
JEL classification: J20, J21, J41 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper presents the features and some preliminary analyses built on a new database constructed in 
Emilia Romagna in 2013. The database collects and elaborates the administrative data from the 
mandatory communications that every employer has to make when taking in and laying off a worker, as 
well as when transforming or extending the duration of a contract. In other words, the administrative 
data concern the whole population of dependent labor in Emilia Romagna, and the database built upon 
allows for labor market analyses hardly ever possible before. 
The specific inspiration that led us to present the database and a small part of the potential applications 
came from the European Social Survey data, as a key contribution that these data can give is an 
assessment of the working life of individuals, a main factor behind life satisfaction as a whole.  
In other words, we can provide further insights into the social and cultural environment (at least in 
Emilia Romagna) with respect to the elements already emerging from the ESS rounds.  
In recent years, most Western economies faced the need to boost market competitiveness, through 
processes of delocalization, off-sourcing, and with regards to the labor market, increases in the degree 
of flexibility. More flexibility was meant to allow a larger share of the population to enter the labor 
market, by means of innovative, short term and so-called “atypical” contractual forms. The parallel 
scope was endowing firms with flexible instruments to meet swings in final demand, as they could turn 
to flexible labor contracts when needed. 
Institutions, in Italy and in many other European countries, were increasingly urged to introduce more 
flexible contracts, as the global markets entered a phase of harsh competitiveness, especially in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, (not to mention the pivotal role of the new Asian manufacturing giants, 
led by China). “Flexisecurity” became almost a must for Spain, France, UK, Germany, Italy; but it must 
be underlined that it started as a progressive liberalization of the labor market at the margin, as short-
term jobs, for instance temporary agency contracts, were increasingly deregulated, while the bulk of the 
permanent contracts legislation was not or only scarcely affected. 
The academic and political debate started questioning the effectiveness of the deregulation in creating 
more opportunities against the odds of instead, more uncertainty in the labor market. Some authors 
started wondering if firms’ productivity was likely to be blessed by such deregulation, or rather suffered 
from the increasing uncertainty and potential lack of motivation and skills of temporary workers. 
The negative effects of the Great Recession probably exacerbated the undesirable aspects of the labor 
market deregulation. As a matter of fact, the composition and nature of contracts changed dramatically. 
In about twenty years, Italy experienced the doubling of temporary jobs, from about 7% in 1994 to 
about 14% in 2014. In other countries, as France, the same figure increased by one third, with 
temporary jobs growing from 11% to 16%, while Germany experienced an increase from 11% to 13%. 
Spain ranked third among OECD countries in 2014 with a figure of 24% (OECD: 2016).  
The European Social Survey data inspired us to investigate about the nature and size of the changing 
labor context in the past years, as the perception and the structure of people’s working life has changed, 
if not dramatically for most workers, at least for some of them. As it also emerges from the literature 
overview, the introduction and deregulation of temporary contract agreements (in the various forms) 
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has introduced more flexibility in the labor market, but higher uncertainty about life prospects and 
income for the future as well.  
We initially moved from the ESS data for Emilia Romagna in 2002 and 2012, as to capture the 
changing perception of life as whole, labor market conditions and expectations. By matching some key 
questions, we were able to detect a clear pattern of increasing uncertainty and decreasing confidence,  
likely to lead to social structure disintegration scenarios as traditional schemes, classes and categories 
might not be holding anymore in the future (e.g. the certainty of the middle-class, the role of past and 
new generations, and so on).  
We took as reference some key questions in a decade time spam to pick a broader panorama; apart 
from this, for Italy, only three rounds of ESS are available (2002, 2004, 2012). We used the ESS online 
database and computed weighted percentages for Emilia Romagna respondents. There were 113 
interviewees in 2002 and 64 interviewees in 2012. As advised, we weighted the table as to take into 
account the sampling procedure and the population size. Figure 1 sums up some of the indicators. The 
idea is that, given the answers about having a paid job or not and the duration of contracts, the feeling 
about household’s income and life satisfaction are likely to be consequently affected and worsen. 
 
Figure 1. Working life and life perception, Emilia Romagna, ESS data, 2002 and 2012 rounds. 
 
 
Starting from figure 1 a) and proceeding clockwise, we go through the change that has been taking 
place among the interviewees from 2002 to 2012. The percentage of those who have never had a paid 
job has increased from 5.3% to 16.3%, hinting for more difficulty for the youngsters to find their first 
occupation in 2012 with respect to 2002. Figure 1 b) finds that the number of individuals engaged with 
a) 
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a limited duration contract has increased from 13.9% in 2002 to 31% in 2012. (This exacerbates the 
national trend, as according to OECD the incidence of the temporary jobs in Italy was 9.86% in 2002 
and grew to 13.79% in 2012). In 2012 moreover, we also get the extra answer of 8.3% of individuals 
with no contract at all at the moment of the interview. Figure 1 c) and d) are about perception. People 
living comfortably on present income fell from 36.8% in 2002 to 11.2% in 2012, while those who feel 
difficulties with the present income increased from 4.9% to 28.5%. This represents the major change in 
the statistics for this question and clearly hints for a worsening in the global life and opportunities 
perception. The last picture, 1 d), shows a negative kurtosis of -0,21 in 2012 with respect to 0.2 in 2002. 
This shift took place since less people concentrated on the higher degrees of satisfaction 7 and 8 (they 
accounted for 27.1% and 27.8% in 2002, down to 16.7% and 23.6% in 2012), with more people 
reporting lower levels of satisfaction. An odd result is the one of those extremely satisfied individuals, a 
minority that, tough, grew from 4.8% to 14.9%. All in all, objective and perceived uncertainty has 
increased.  
Do we find evidence for matching changes in the labor market for Emilia Romagna in our data? The 
answer is positive, at it will become clear below.  
 
2. The institutional framework and benchmark studies. 
 
Italy started experiencing some major labor market reforms at the beginning of the 1990s, with the 
agreements putting an end of the so-called “scala-mobile”, an automatic system of wage indexation in 
1993. Institutional reforms concerning new, temporary and atypical job contracts have been gradually 
introduced since the mid-1990s. The first major intervention has been the “pacchetto Treu”, from the 
name of the Labor Minister at the time. For the first time, this law gave legal recognition to a number 
of non-standard work arrangements. The second important milestone was the Biagi reform in 2003, 
which attributed legal content to additional temporary work arrangements (job on call, staff leasing, 
etc.), defined in more detail the functions of work agencies and increased the number of services they 
can offer (CNEL, 2006). 
 
To provide a glimpse of how much these reforms have impacted on the regulatory framework, we 
could report the Employment Protection Index (EPL) constructed by the OECD: in 2008 Italy ranked 
broadly mid-field in OECD comparison (twenty-fifth out of forty countries) with the EPL indicators 
being 1.89 against an OECD average of 1.94. Back in 1990, Italy ranked fourth out of twenty-six 
countries in the same decreasing order of protection (Battisti and Vallanti, 2013). Moreover, when 
looking at the most recent data on Employment protection, the deregulation at the margin triggered a 
decrease in the employment protection of temporary workers from 4.75 in 1997 to 2 in 2013, while the 
related indexes for permanent workers basically remained unaltered.  
 
In 2015 another major reform was introduced, the so called “Jobs Act”, which has determined a deep 
change in the Italian industrial relations. Bringing at completion a reform process begun in the 1990s, 
the Jobs Act has introduced a new contract type - ‘contratto a tutele crescenti’ - implying a substantial 
downsize of he obligation for workers’ reinstatement in case of firms invalidly firing them. The new 
permanent contract is therefore deprived of the substantial previous requirements of an open-ended 
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contract. Although the effectiveness of the law in boosting employment growth is questioned (Fana, 
Guarascio, Cirillo, 2015), it has represented an intervention in the direction of introducing flexibility at 
the core of the permanent contracts agreements. 
 
The academic focus concerning labor market reforms in Italy (and elsewhere) has been especially 
directed to the “stepping-stone” versus the opposite “dead lock” testing hypothesis. As for other 
European countries, and as highlighted when introducing the ESS data, changing working conditions 
can impact on the perceived well-being both on the material and psychological plan (De Graaf-Zijil, 
2005), and therefore on the life quality and life style of the society as a whole. If ever increasing 
temporary jobs fail to create a secure job environment, perhaps resulting in an infinite cycle of 
temporary jobs, the outcomes could be far from desirable. Jahn, Riphahn Schnabel (2012), when 
assessing the impact of labor market deregulation of firms productivity, point to a possible trade-off 
between efficiency and equity.  
 
The research on the working life of people has often turned to sophisticated instruments to see if after 
being granted temporary contracts, workers are likely or not to end up with permanent jobs. The 
evidence is mixed, and results change depending on the specific type of contract considered, on age, 
gender, labor market context, and so on, but it is also likely to depend on the methodology used 
(Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2008). In Europe, there is some unclear evidence concerning the 
effectiveness of temporary jobs in leading to more stable – or fixed term contractual agreements.  
On one side, the introduction of “atypical” or “flexible” contractual agreements may actually give an 
opportunity to enter the labor market where none existed before. Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini (2008) 
detect two broad theoretical points of view for why temporary employment could offer a springboard 
to stable jobs: 1) more able workers can use temporary work to signal their skill by making themselves 
available for screening and 2) temporary jobs may be an opportunity to build extra human capital, social 
contacts and information. Whenever point 1) prevails, the screening procedure can also induce less 
shirking and build more stable relationships between employers and employees (Portugal and Varejao, 
2009). In the same article, Ichino et al. (2008) provide positive evidence for the springboard effect for 
workers hired through temporary agencies. Some effectiveness of the stepping-stone is also found in 
Barbieri and Sestito (2008). On the other, the “trap” or “deadlock” hypothesis in an endless precarious 
condition cannot be ruled out, so that the empirical investigation only can provide some evidence.  
According to Blanchard and Landier (2002), the use of temporary workers as buffer stocks increases 
job instability and uncertainty inside the firm, reduces investment in training, lowers workplace 
cooperation and workers’ motivation, and harm long-run growth prospects. Exactly the opposite 
evidence as the one found for Italy by Ichino et al. (2008) is instead found in Spain by Amuedo-
Dorantes et al., (2008). In the US, Autor and Houseman (2010) take into consideration a welfare-to-
work program in Detroit and find that temporary help placements may even harm subsequent 
employment and earnings outcome.  
Across Europe, temporary jobs are associated with poorer labor conditions with respect to standard 
employment: lower wages, lower training, higher job insecurity, and lower protection from social 
security. In their introduction to an Economic Journal Symposium on temporary jobs, Booth et al. 
(2002) summarize the thrust of the contributions as suggesting that the expansion of temporary jobs as 
a way of increasing labor market flexibility may be undesirable, although in some case they indeed find 
some stepping stone evidence in the case of British workers. Booth, Francesconi and Frank (2002) are 
the authors of a pioneering work on the stepping stone hypothesis, where apart from assessing the 
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existence of such “entry port”, they also find that temporary workers in Great Britain report lower level 
of job satisfaction, receive less training and lower wages. 
Studying the same subject for Australia, Cai, Law and Bathgate (2014) interestingly model the 
evaluation of the different starting statuses, in particular, when trying to assess the correct probability of 
transitioning into a fixed term contract from a temporary job, the individuals out of the labor force 
(Not in the Labor Force, NILF) should be considered as a baseline case, as those who are simply 
unemployed are anyway putting some effort into finding a job. They find evidence for the stepping 
stone effect. Addison, Cotti and Surfield (2015) tested the stepping stone for the US workers, finding 
positive results and controlling for the endogeneity that may lead a worker to be in a given position 
rather to another, with the special caveat that the labor market in the US is highly polarized between 
temporary, unskilled, low-pay workers and high-pay, specialized, temporary consultants and 
contractors. Drawing on data from representative national longitudinal studies, Scherer (2004) finds 
that lower mobility chances in Italy, and the strongly segmented labor market in Germany, inhibit the 
exit out of a labor market segment once it has been entered, therefore hinting for an entrapment effect 
in lower status positions. 
 
Findings in Figure 1 are partially supported by the research by van Oorschot and Chung (2015), who 
use ESS data to analyze feelings of income insecurity among workers, finding that labour market 
policies matter, but affluence matters, too. 
 
Across the literature, a number of studies focused on the wage differences existing between fixed term 
and temporary contracts. In principle, there may be a reason for temporary workers to have higher 
wages than open-ended counterparts, as a premium pay for the relative instability of their position and 
since they allow employers to save in term of takes and social contributions. In reality, the opposite can 
happen, as temporary workers are seen as a low-cost resource to deploy on demand, that is costly to 
invest on, as the worker may be just in search of the right job or might be searching for better positions 
at the end of the contract. 
Pavlopoulos (2013) finds a wage penalty for entering the labor market through temporary contracts for 
British males (7.1%) and especially British females (21.2%), while in Germany this wage penalty for 
temporary starters is inferior (4.5% for males and 3% for females). Ghinetti (2013) finds that the port 
of entry hypothesis is verified in Italy only for few individuals, where the entry is more likely – but with 
associated lower wage growth – when staying with the same employer.  
Another, smaller, stream of literature is investigating the impact of recent labor market reforms on 
firms’ productivity, which is also at least partially related to changes in wages. Battisti and Vallanti 
(2013) evaluate for the Italian data the impact of the share of atypical jobs (together with other factors) 
on firms’ productivity, finding a negative impact when the temporary jobs do not turn into stable jobs. 
Dolado, Ortigueira and Stucchi (2012) investigate Spanish firms TFP by means of the Olley and Pakes 
decomposition, modeling a dual labor market where TFP is negatively affected by the increase in the 
gap between firing permanent workers and temporary workers. In other words, market reforms at the 
margin are not conducive to higher TFP for firms, as the incentive to put effort by temporary workers 
and the incentive to train by firms decrease. 
Bassanini, Nunziata and Venn (2009) find that mandatory dismissal regulations have a depressing 
impact on TFP growth in industries where layoff restrictions are more likely to be binding. They also 
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find that the dampening impact of EPL on productivity appears to be entirely due to the effect of 
dismissal regulations, while restrictions on the use of temporary employment have, if any, a positive 
impact on TFP growth. In other words, even though in recent years many countries have chosen to 
ease regulations on temporary and atypical contracts to make their labor market more flexible, the 
productivity growth pay-off that can be expected from these reforms is very low. 
Cappellari, dell’Aringa, Leonardi (2012) find that the reform of apprenticeship contracts in Italy 
increased job turnover and induced the substitution of external staff with firms’ apprentices, with an 
overall productivity-enhancing effect. But they report as well that the reform of fixed-term contracts 
instead did not produce the intended results: it induced a substitution of temporary employees in favor 
of external staff and reduced capital intensity, generating productivity losses. 
Hirsch and Mueller (2012)  investigate plant level productivity on a panel of German firms, finding that 
an inversely U-shaped relationship between temporary agency workers use and productivity, so that the 
effect of adopting temp workers up to the 15% of total workforce is positive, but becomes insignificant 
above that threshold. A similar result is found for Spain,  where Roca-Puig, Beltrán-Martín and Segarra-
Ciprés (2015) find a negative linear relationship between temporary contracts and labor productivity 
and a predominantly positive concave downward curve between temporary contracts and gross 
operating margin. 
 
The administrative data elaboration we draw upon benefitted to a great extent by the experience and 
insights developed by Fondazione Obiettivo Lavoro and CRISP in Lombardy (see for instance, 
Fondazione Obiettivo Lavoro and CRISP, 2013) and by Veneto Lavoro (see for instance Anastasia et 
al. 2010).  Their pioneering analyses helped in interpreting the administrative data and traced the paths 
for the empirical research in this relatively new and unexploited field. 
 
3. The SILER database. 
 
SILER (Sistema Informativo sul Lavoro in Emilia Romagna) is a proprietary database that collects all 
the mandatory communications that must be sent to a specific office (Centro per l’impiego) whenever a 
new labor contract is created, extended, transformed or ceased in the region Emilia Romagna. The 
transmission is made online, and the responsibility for the communication lies with the employer. The 
collection of the information takes place at regional level, and it is afterwards pooled by the Ministry of 
Labor, where a national report is produced. The national data, however, remains property of the 
Ministry and only samples for research are publicly available in Italy.  
The SILER offers a wide range of possibilities to analyze the trend and dynamics of the labor force in 
Emilia Romagna, before the same data is processed at national level. Since every person 1  in the 
dependent labor market of the region can be detected into the database, it becomes possible to track 
the working life of people in a given time span and to follow them until the exit from the dependent 
                                                          
1Every person who underwent a registration, termination, transformation or extension of a contract in Emilia Romagna 
since 2008. 
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labor market. So, features as age, education, citizenship and industry, among others, can be related to 
the length and type of the contractual agreements undersigned.  
The treatment of the data for statistical purposes has been impressive. Since about 7 million people 
appear at least once in the database, it became necessary to estimate the number of those who never 
appeared, since they had been working before the mandatory communications appeared in 2000; to set 
starting points for the analyses, since workers start working at different points in time and sometimes 
keep working with the same or a new contract on the last day of collection and observation of the data; 
some workers have several contracts in a given period of time (and sometimes there are cases where the 
number of contracts for the same individual, even at the same time, is surprisingly high).  
From the point of view of workers, the database offers a unique view on the pattern of their working 
life and contributes significantly to the empirical studies of the labor market, not only from the 
economic point of view, but also from the institutional side. While linking the results to 
macroeconomics data is tricky but interesting (for reasons that will become clear below), it is possible 
to evaluate the appreciation of the types of contracts arising through the years: basically permanent jobs 
vs. all the universe of flexible and atypical contracts.  
To a larger extent, since also employers can be detected from the database, and their data crossed with 
available balance sheets and sectoral reports, the database allows for shedding light on the economy as 
a whole, in terms of output, labor productivity, seasonality, and so on. 
As already mentioned, the information in SILER allows for several perspectives of analysis. For our 
preliminary analyses, we chose to detect a panel of individual for a preliminary evaluation of the 
individual and external features that determine the type of contract held at given point in time and to 
map the typical sequence on contracts as a first attempt to contribute to the findings over the stepping-
stone evidence. Moreover, as a descriptive exercise, we are also able to compute the duration of 
contracts for this group of workers as well as the spell of time without any formal contractual 
agreement between one contract and the other. This particular feature of the data allows for interesting 
inference on the length of unemployment. 
 
3.1. Some descriptive statistics. 
 
A general view on the SILER data, with descriptive statistics and analyses on the whole population, can 
be found in the Rapporto Annuale 2015 - Il mercato del Lavoro in Emilia-Romagna (Ervet, 2015). 
Here, we started by extracting a sample of workers observed through five years, 2008 – 2012, in order 
to track the working life pattern of all the individuals who appeared for the first time in 2008 with a 
contract. Specifically, the workers were chosen according to the following criterion: we considered all 
the workers who had at least one contract starting in 2008 and had up to five contracts overall during 
the period 2008 – 2012. We subsequently chose to focus on individuals with up to five contracts in the 
2008-2012 time span, as those with six or more contracts in five years represented a minority of the 
population (14.3% against the 85.7% of those with at maximum five contracts in the period). 
Ideally, the workers can therefore be split into five groups: those who only have one contract in the five 
years considered, started in 2008; those who have 2, 3, 4, and 5 contracts, but with at least one contract 
starting in 2008. We don’t consider here those workers who have been working since 2007 or earlier 
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and are still on the job in the five years 2008- 2012; and those who start a job in 2009-2012, but not in 
2008, so perhaps they start in 2009 and keep working (they never appear in the present study). Table 1 
reports the workers according to the number of contracts. 
 
Table 1. Workers with at least one contract started in 2008 and number of contracts held (up to 
five contracts, 2008 – 2012). 
NUMBER OF 
CONTRACTS 
WORKERS PERCENTAGE 
1 234284 41,35 
2 126904 22,4 
3 83364 14,71 
4 60524 10,68 
5 61563 10,86 
      
Total 566639 100 
 
Totally, there are 1288095 contracts started in the 2008-2012 time span, that result in 2.27 contracts per 
person on average. Some of the contracts we consider are concluded before the end of the 
quinquennial (before 31.12.2012), but we don’t investigate further on what follows; some other 
contracts are still “alive” on 31.12.2012, but still, we don’t investigate on what follows. Notice that for 
those contracts not ending on December 31, 2012, but still “alive”, we required a virtual conclusion on 
that date, so to be able to account for the whole period the workers have been working until the end of 
our observation period. Some other contracts overlap for the same person, since it happens for part-
time workers, for example, to have more than one job at a time. Given this structure, the data do not 
represent a natural panel, even if a panel can be built and dealt with the usual techniques.  
For each worker we can observe: age at the beginning of the (first) contract, sex, citizenship, type of 
contract according to the taxonomy reported in the Appendix2 and under Table 2, education level, 
economic macro sector, province, professional category, skill level. Two time variables have been 
computed: the length of the contracts in days, and the length of the time span between one contract 
and another, for those individuals having at least two non-overlapping contracts in the quinquennial. 
This second time variable can be considered the “waiting time” between the end of a contract and the 
start of another, for those workers having a contract starting after the end of the previous one in the 
quinquennial. We don’t observe the effective length of time between two contracts in the case the first 
ends before December 31, 2012, and the second starts from January 1, 2013, onwards. 
The initial set contains 566,639 workers aged between 13 and 75, with this age bracket representing the 
age at the beginning of the first contract registered in 2008 (the age information is available for 565,500 
individuals). In order to fully appreciate the information on contractual types, it is advisable to 
preliminary go through Table A1, where each type of contractual agreement, as reclassified by Ervet 
                                                          
2The Ervet reclassification of contractual types was created in 2013 in order to summarize into 8 categories a number of 
various agreements. The variables according to which contracts were pooled into categories are duration, the degree of 
independence from the employer, flexibility in working hours and other social variables. 
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(2015) is illustrated3. Basically, we have open-ended contracts on one side, (representing the 30% of the 
first contractual agreements signed in 2008), and atypical contracts on the other, fully differentiated into 
seven subgroups of temporary contractual agreement 4 . Our set, referring to the first contractual 
agreement signed in 2008 can be described by the figures in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of workers by working arrangement (mean values) 
  CTI CTD ELAV LDOM LINT LPAR SOM CAI 
  
OPEN-
ENDED 
CONTRACTS 
FIXED 
TERM 
CONTRACTS 
INTERNSHIPS 
DOMESTIC 
WORKERS 
JOBS 
ON 
CALL 
PARASUBORDINATE WORK 
CONTRACTS 
TEMPORARY 
AGENCY 
WORK 
CONTRACTS 
APPRENTICESHIPS 
AND ACCESS-TO-
WORK CONTRACTS 
Individual 
characteristics         
Age 36.26 35.92 22.62 41.30 33.26 38.51 30.77 21.04 
Female 0.40 0.50 0.56 0.86 0.56 0.45 0.42 0.42 
Foreign 0.26 0.28 0.10 0.91 0.17 0.08 0.24 0.22 
Education level         
Primary School 0.59 0.61 0.60 0.88 0.64 0.69 0.54 0.67 
Junior High 
School 0.20 0.22 0.15 0.06 0.22 0.11 0.23 0.18 
High School 0.16 0.13 0.18 0.04 0.13 0.13 0.19 0.14 
University 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.02 
Job characteristics         
Duration in daysa 855.7 225.7 156.0 393.1 339.3 346.2 139.2 395.5 
Part time 0.22 0.25 0.12 0.81 0.23 0.06 0.16 0.19 
Waiting time in 
daysb 107.0 178.9 240.4 180.7 220.9 152.8 123.8 243.6 
Overlappingc 0.009 0.009 0.003 0.052 0.008 0.002 0.005 0.006 
Industrial Sector         
Industry 0.27 0.16 0.22 0.01 0.04 0.12 0.55 0.25 
Agriculture 0.008 0.181 0.010 0.003 0.001 0.006 0.006 0.005 
Trade and 
Tourism 0.16 0.24 0.23 0.01 0.63 0.14 0.18 0.33 
Services 0.39 0.24 0.44 0.97 0.28 0.50 0.20 0.22 
Educationd 0.038 0.064 0.036 0.000 0.014 0.169 0.002 0.002 
Construction 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.16 
Skill level         
High 0.26 0.14 0.41 0.01 0.09 0.67 0.11 0.12 
Medium 0.44 0.47 0.50 0.22 0.72 0.28 0.42 0.79 
Low 0.30 0.39 0.09 0.78 0.20 0.05 0.43 0.09 
N 175532 241331 9250 18801 9637 43285 36248 29805 
Notes 
a:For open-ended contracts of contracts lasting more than 5 years, the maximum allowed is 1826 days. Part time contracts were weighted by 0.5 as for 
lenght. 
b: Only for those individuals with more than one contract in the 2008-2012 time span, as number of days between the end of the first contract and 
beginning of the second contract, with non-overlapping contracts 
                                                          
3The Ervet reclassification is aimed at creating uniform job categories. Nonetheless, about 8 percent of contracts were the 
result of merging two different types, whenever the first one was transformed in another contractual type, such as from 
fixed-term to an open-ended type. For details on the initial treatment of the data, see CRISP (2014). 
4It must be underlined, though, that the number of people with an open-ended contract is much higher than 30%, over total 
Emilia Romagna’s workforce: here we pick the moment of creation of new contracts, but do not observe pre-existing 
contracts that did not undergo some kind of mandatory communication.  
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c: Percentage of individuals with more than one contract at once, after the first one registered 
d: Workers in the Education sector, as a proxy for employees in the Public Sector. They were subtracted from the Services sector 
 
Younger workers are engaged in apprenticeships and internships, but the way to the open-ended 
contract is quite long, since on average a workers gets one at 36. Domestic workers, that are females 
(and foreign) are the older workers, followed by those workers with parasubordinate contractual 
agreements. The percentage of males in open-ended contracts is 60%, a first sign of gender 
discrimination that appears also from other indicators (as the fragmentation of working life contracts, 
much higher for women, even if we can’t tell without further investigation if this is at least partly due to 
individual/family preferences). The educational attainments of workers is pretty low. University degrees 
(and post-university education) is pretty rare. Fixed term contracts on average last about eight months, 
while the shortest duration is registered for temporary agency workers. It must also be underlined that 
these workers are also those who wait less between the first contract and the following one, while it 
takes really long to find another job after an internship. Open-ended contracts are the most popular in 
Services and Industry, while jobs on call are especially concentrated in Trade and Tourism (this is 
explained with the seasonality of the touristic area on the seaside of Romagna). Parasubordinate 
workers are those with the highest average skill level (in fact, they are also those with a high 
concentration of university graduates). Domestic, female workers, are those with the lowest skill level.  
Finally, Table 3 presents a focus on job pathways over the 2008 – 2012 time span for the workers as a 
whole, where for every worker, the first and the last contractual arrangement is picked, according to the 
total number of contracts held (up to five, see above). While we will perform a more accurate sequence 
analysis of contractual agreements on the next paragraph, we just give here a snapshot of those workers 
who obtain an open-ended contract as the last contractual agreement registered. We do not report 
those workers who started with an open-ended contract in 2008 and did not have other contracts 
subsequently in 2008 – 2012 (44% of workers with only one contract, starting in 2008, have an open-
ended contract). 
 
Table 3. Transition rates to the final open-ended contract, 2008-2012 
Panel 3a 
 OPEN-ENDED CONTRACT AS ENDING ARRANGEMENT BY NUMBER OF CONTRACTS 
INITIAL ARRANGEMENT 2 contracts 3 contracts 4 contracts 5 contracts 
CAI - Apprenticeships and 
access-to-work contracts 2595 1586 939 536 
CTD - Fixed term 
contracts 15414 11848 9715 6481 
CTI - Open-ended 
contracts 27129 10698 4842 2346 
ELAV - Internships 882 668 412 225 
LDOM Domestic workers 626 390 252 158 
LINT - Jobs on call 487 320 224 140 
LPAR - 
Parasubordinate work 
contracts 2471 1877 1099 714 
SOM - Temporary agency 
work contracts 3597 3091 2079 1554 
n.a. 259 158 82 40 
N 53460 30636 19644 12194 
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Panel 3b 
PERCENTAGE OF WORKERS ENDING WITH AN OPEN-ENDED CONTRACT OVER TOTAL ENDING CONTRACTS 
INITIAL ARRANGEMENT 2 contracts 3 contracts 4 contracts 5 contracts 
CAI - Apprenticeships and 
access-to-work contracts 0.34 0.30 0.24 0.19 
CTD - Fixed term 
contracts 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.16 
CTI - Open-ended 
contracts 0.72 0.60 0.51 0.42 
ELAV - Internships 0.35 0.36 0.32 0.27 
LDOM Domestic workers 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 
LINT - Jobs on call 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.16 
LPAR - 
Parasubordinate work 
contracts 0.24 0.26 0.22 0.17 
SOM - Temporary agency 
work contracts 0.37 0.40 0.37 0.35 
n.a. 0.51 0.52 0.44 0.33 
 
The main feature of Table 3 is that an hysteresis of the open-ended contracts is well evident, as found 
for example by Addison et al. (2015). 72% of workers who had an initial open-ended contract also have 
an open-ended contract a second job, 60% as a third job, and so on. Therefore, the observational 
likelihood to enter a final open-ended contract seems to depend crucially from the fact of having the 
same type of agreement before. If we were to pick some signs of stepping stones from here, it does not 
seem that having different contractual agreements leads to higher probabilities of an open-ended 
contract as final arrangement. If any, it seems that temporary agency workers have a higher probability 
of entering an open-ended contract with respect to the institutionally longer agreement, the fixed term 
contract: for those with two contracts, 37% of workers were temporary agency workers, versus only 
30% of fixed term contracts. Therefore, we find here traces for an effect which could go on the 
opposite direction of what was found by Amuedo-Dorantes et al., (2007), as for the Spanish case 
agency workers endured a lower likelihood of being hired on a permanent basis following their 
temporary assignment than their direct-hire counterparts.  
 
To fully check for this effect, we would need to analyze transitions, given the same employer. From 
here, data could instead suggest that a learning effect is taking place for temporary agency workers, as 
they have a higher chance to be subsequently hired with regular contract than their fixed term 
counterparts. Or perhaps firms are using temporary agency workers as a screening device, while they 
are adopting fixed term contracts as a real alternative to regular contracts, and not in the perspective of 
hiring workers on a more stable basis. This is supported by the strong hysteresis featuring also fixed 
term contracts, as it is very likely that having a previous fixed-term contract will also imply a final fixed 
term agreement. 
 
We also computed Kaplan-Meier estimates of both completed and uncompleted durations (in days, this 
should reach a maximum of 1826 days, that is five years, as the contracts ending after December 31st, 
2012 were artificially closed on that date) for the first contracts registered in 2008 for the 569633 
individuals of our sample (we did not consider here the whole duration of all the contracts started after 
the first one considered).  
 
The estimates in Figure 2 reveal that the median duration of all contracts, but open-ended ones, is less 
than one year. In particular, internships have a median duration of 92 days, temporary agency contracts 
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have a median duration of 73 days, and fixed-term contracts have a median duration of 119 days. 
Overall, among temporary jobs, only domestic labor and parasubordinate workers have a median 
duration over six months.  
 
 
Figure 2. Kaplan-Meier estimates of job durations. 
 
 
 
We also adopted the Kaplan Meier approach to compute the “waiting time” between the first contract 
undersigned in 2008 and the following one, for those individuals who have more than one contract in 
the 2008-2012 period, (but not-overlapping contracts). This seems a crucial information to get an 
insight of which initial type of contract performs better in terms of reduced (probably?) unwanted 
spells of non-employment. (Similarly, one could ask with another analysis which type of second 
contract performs better in terms of decreasing the waiting time after the end of the first contract).  
 
Figure 3 illustrates the waiting time in days between the end of the first contract and the second 
contract. The median value of the waiting time for open-ended contracts is 1 day. The waiting time 
increases for temporary jobs; temporary agency workers are those who wait less before entering a 
second contract (median of 16 days ), followed by parasubordinate workers (25 days). The situation is 
instead more dramatic for those whose first contract is an apprenticeship (median of 88 days). From 
the figure, we notice that 50% of the workers find a second job, after the first one registered, in less 
than six months. The average waiting time across all types of contracts is 163 days. 
Focusing on the open-ended contract as a second contract, it is interesting to assess how efficient (or 
rather, not-efficient) is the eventual transition to a permanent contractual position, starting from any of 
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the possible contractual types observed. Table 4 collects the average and median waiting time in days 
for workers who end up with a permanent position as a second contract.  
 
 
Figure 3. Kaplan-Meier estimates of the waiting time between the first the second contract. 
 
 
While we already discussed the waiting time in general, assessing for instance how the open-ended 
contract workers wait less than anyone else when entering another open-ended contract (as confirmed 
here), the interpretation of the median of the distribution has some equity and efficiency implications. 
Basically speaking, the higher the number of people who have to wait a lot before getting a new job, the 
more unfair is the functioning of the matching between demand and supply of workers in the market, 
coeteris paribus. On the basis of the number of people in each category of contractual agreement 
observed during their transition in the open-ended contract, it is possible to elaborate an indicator for 
the relative inefficiency of the transition. (I.I.). 
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Table 4. Waiting time in days before an open-ended contract as a second contract. 
Initial contract 
Waiting time in days between first and second contract, when the second contract is open-ended and the 
two contracts do not overlap 
  Average Median Number of workers 
CAI - Apprenticeships and 
access-to-work contracts 137 5 3449 
CTD - Fixed term contracts 132 20 23194 
CTI - Open-ended 
contracts 64 1 41337 
ELAV - Internships 143 5 1065 
LDOM Domestic workers 138 26 1013 
LINT - Jobs on call 158 2 785 
LPAR - 
Parasubordinate work 
contracts 126 4 3633 
SOM - Temporary agency 
work contracts 90 3 5175 
n.a. 117 4 336 
 
The indicator therefore weights the waiting time by the number of workers concerned by the transition 
into a permanent job over the total number of workers in transition. Table 5 represent the Inefficiency 
Indicator I. I., pointing clear at the fixed term contract as the worst initial contract before entering a 
permanent position. 
 
Table 5. Inefficiency indicator of transition towards the open-ended job. 
Initial contract Weighted median waiting 
time 
CAI - Apprenticeships and access-to-work contracts 5.91 
CTD - Fixed term contracts 38.28 
CTI - Open-ended contracts 33.07 
ELAV - Internships 1.90 
LDOM Domestic workers 1.75 
LINT - Jobs on call 1.55 
LPAR - Parasubordinate work contracts 5.72 
SOM - Temporary agency work contracts 5.82 
n.a. 0.49 
 
 
4. Methodology and quantitative analysis 
 
In the following paragraphs, we exploit the richness of the observational data and perform two types of 
analysis: 1) a multinomial cross-section of the first contract registered for each worker in the sample 
(started in 2008) and 2) the analysis of the sequence of contracts according to the type of contract and 
economic branch of activity. We created two different databases according to the scope of the analysis. 
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In the first, each person is linked to the string of all the contracts entered in the period 2008 – 2012. In 
the second, the first database is transformed and a chronological order for the contracts is built (by 
setting an order for the contracts on the basis of the starting and ending date, if present, or forced on 
December 31, 2012).  
 
4.1. Multinomial analysis 
 
We ran a multinomial logit regression on a given type of contractual agreement to find out which 
individual or context variables do have an effect on the probability of observing the chosen benchmark 
category; in particular, we focus on the first type of contract started in 2008 and analyze the features of 
the workers and job type to assess how much internal and external factors affect the likelihood to be 
involved in a given contractual agreement.  
Secondly, we ran a multinomial analysis for the second type of contract observed for every individual 
with at least two contracts, given the initial category of contract. We could therefore track the 
likelihood of ending up with a given type contract, given the previous status. In this second step, we 
ruled out those type of contracts that are not deemed to be proper “dependent labor” contracts, that is 
domestic labor, jobs on call and traineeships.  
The multinomial analysis allows for computing the “success probability” of an event with respect to a 
base event category, using as explaining factors the people’s features, the location of the contract, the 
economic branch, and so on. This methodological approach is used in the literature seen above, when 
trying to assess the stepping stone hypothesis, toward a fixed term contract type. It fits those situations 
where the variable one wants to explain in terms of success/not success is of categorical type, and the 
related fitted coefficients for the explanatory variables (relative risks ratios) describe the probability that 
an event belongs to a given category with respect to the base event/category, that can be arbitrarily 
chosen, when a change in the explanatory variable is observed. We created dummies for the economic 
sectors and for the Bologna province. The following equation: 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑛𝑎 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +
𝛽6𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑚 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽8𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠    
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖 = 0,1, … ,7   are the eight different types of contractual agreements. 
 
is estimated through the maximum likelihood method (Greene, 2011; Verbeek, 2012). As already 
mentioned, we removed overlapping contractual agreements, since we only take into consideration the 
first contract observed. We have the contract type information for 563,889 individuals, that is for the 
99.5% of the workers. Age is the age at the beginning of the contract; Sex is a dummy equal to 1 if the 
worker is female; Citizenship is a dummy equal to 1 if the worker is not an Italian citizen. The other 
variables represent the province dummies for Bologna and the macroeconomic sectors where the job is 
taken.  
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Table 4. Multinomial logit. Determinants of contractual types, first contract (2008) 
    Number of 
observations 
  561494 
  LR chi2(84)   322545.82 
  Prob > chi2   0.0000 
Log-likelihood -684585.68 Pseudo R2   0.1907 
Base outcome: fixed-
term contracts 
    
    Relative-risk ratio Std. Error z P>|z| 
Open-ended 
contracts 
    
 Age 1.02 0.0003 40.36 0.0000 
 Female 0.7 0.0051 -48.95 0.0000 
 Foreign 0.98 0.0078 -1.58 0.1140 
 University degree 1.37 0.0229 19.28 0.0000 
 High School degree 1.27 0.0123 24.89 0.0000 
 Bologna 1.37 0.0110 39.73 0.0000 
 Education 0.85 0.0199 -6.92 0.0000 
 Trade & Tourism 1.01 0.0194 0.57 0.5710 
 Industry 2.31 0.0440 44.11 0.0000 
 Services 2.36 0.0441 46.32 0.0000 
 Agriculture 0.06 0.0021 -85.61 0.0000 
 Constructions 1.84 0.0384 29.33 0.0000 
 constant  0.34 0.0074 -49.44 0.0000 
Apprenticeships      
 Age 0.75 0.001 -166.23 0.0000 
 Female 1.00 0.015 0.07 0.9460 
 Foreign 0.72 0.012 -19.33 0.0000 
 University degree 1.55 0.077 8.96 0.0000 
 High School degree 1.25 0.026 10.91 0.0000 
 Bologna 1.15 0.020 8.48 0.0000 
 Education 0.09 0.013 -17.45 0.0000 
 Trade & Tourism 1.28 0.050 6.5 0.0000 
 Industry 2.01 0.080 17.78 0.0000 
 Services 1.26 0.050 5.91 0.0000 
 Agriculture 0.03 0.003 -37.91 0.0000 
 Constructions 3.16 0.133 27.33 0.0000 
 constant  1.44 1.440 95.71 0.0000 
Parasubordinates      
 Age 1.020 0.000 50.97 0.0000 
 Female 0.630 0.007 -38.7 0.0000 
 Foreign 0.270 0.005 -68.31 0.0000 
 University degree 1.130 0.026 5.56 0.0000 
 High School degree 0.760 0.013 -15.98 0.0000 
 Bologna 1.690 0.021 43.24 0.0000 
 Education 3.320 0.117 34.23 0.0000 
 Trade & Tourism 0.870 0.030 -4.03 0.0000 
 Industry 1.020 0.036 0.68 0.4940 
 Services 3.310 0.102 34.92 0.0000 
 Agriculture 0.040 0.003 -44.88 0.0000 
 Constructions 0.770 0.031 -6.46 0.0000 
 constant  0.060 0.003 -70.62 0.0000 
Traineeships      
 Age 0.790 0.002 -94.08 0.0000 
 Female 1.190 0.028 7.81 0.0000 
 Foreign 0.350 0.012 -29.46 0.0000 
 University degree 3.400 0.154 27.02 0.0000 
 High School degree 1.340 0.040 10.07 0.0000 
 Bologna 1.220 0.032 7.68 0.0000 
 Education 1.020 0.084 0.26 0.7980 
 Trade & Tourism 0.820 0.052 -3.13 0.0020 
 Industry 1.730 0.110 8.67 0.0000 
 Services 2.180 0.134 12.72 0.0000 
 Agriculture 0.070 0.009 -21.1 0.0000 
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 Constructions 0.620 0.055 -5.33 0.0000 
 constant  1.310 1.046 32.53 0.0000 
Domestic Labor      
 Age 1.05 0.001 63.55 0.0000 
 Female 4.82 0.114 66.37 0.0000 
 Foreign 2.78 0.789 117.66 0.0000 
 University degree 0.72 0.046 -5.11 0.0000 
 High School degree 0.72 0.033 -7.04 0.0000 
 Bologna 1.17 0.026 7.57 0.0000 
 Education 0.15 0.056 -5.09 0.0000 
 Trade & Tourism 0.34 0.043 -8.58 0.0000 
 Industry 0.80 0.101 -1.76 0.0790 
 Services 2.95 3.027 33.08 0.0000 
 Agriculture 0.11 0.018 -13.48 0.0000 
 Constructions 1.12 0.163 0.8 0.4240 
 constant  0.00 0.000 -87.89 0.0000 
Jobs on call      
 Age 0.99 0.001 -9.1 0.0000 
 Female 0.96 0.021 -2.12 0.0340 
 Foreign 0.53 0.015 -22.24 0.0000 
 University degree 0.47 0.036 -9.88 0.0000 
 High School degree 0.69 0.022 -11.5 0.0000 
 Bologna 0.62 0.019 -15.51 0.0000 
 Education 0.27 0.028 -12.69 0.0000 
 Trade & Tourism 2.94 0.170 18.68 0.0000 
 Industry 0.28 0.021 -16.88 0.0000 
 Services 1.37 0.082 5.38 0.0000 
 Agriculture 0.01 0.002 -15.39 0.0000 
 Constructions 0.14 0.017 -15.76 0.0000 
 constant  0.06 0.004 -41.59 0.0000 
      
Temporary agency 
work  
    
 Age 0.96 0.0006 -63.16 0.0000 
 Female 0.86 0.0108 -11.83 0.0000 
 Foreign 0.87 0.0123 -9.86 0.0000 
 University degree 1.00 0.0410 10.26 0.0000 
 High School degree 1.60 0.0219 19.65 0.0000 
 Bologna 1.36 0.0229 38.81 0.0000 
 Education 0.03 0.0043 -27.03 0.0000 
 Trade & Tourism 0.80 0.0267 -6.65 0.0000 
 Industry 3.84 0.1223 42.41 0.0000 
 Services 0.90 0.0297 -3.20 0.0010 
 Agriculture 0.05 0.0038 -40.74 0.0000 
 Constructions 0.38 0.0176 -20.91 0.0000 
  constant  0.44 0.0164 -21.92 0.0000 
 
When examining the relative risks ratios, the interpretation is the following: each reported value 
measures the effect of the given variable of the probability of getting a specific contractual type with 
respect to the base outcome category, in our case the fixed term contracts. As expected, age at the 
beginning of the contract has a positive impact on all types of contract but traineeships, 
apprenticeships, jobs on call and somehow temporary agency workers.  Being female does not improve 
the “risk” of being hired into an open-ended contract with respect to a fixed term contract, but females 
are especially unlikely to get a parasubordinate job, with respect to all the other job categories; instead, 
being female represents a plus when domestic labor is taken into account, and with a much stronger 
risk ratio (4.82) than any other variable and category. The gender effect is particularly reinforced by 
being a foreign worker, as being foreign for domestic labor is the only situation where the relative risk 
ratio is pretty larger than 1 and significantly different from zero. In all other cases, being foreign sounds 
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more as a disadvantage. This evidence is explained by the widespread phenomenon of foreign, mid-
aged women coming from abroad to work as caretakers. Women have a marginal advantage respect to 
men only in two entry-level categories of contracts, traineeships and apprenticeships.  
Having an university-level degree has a positive impact over all categories with respect to fixed term 
contracts, but on domestic labor, jobs on call and temporary agency workers. The category that benefits 
more from a university degree (with an effect almost triple than the other types) is traineeships, 
indicating as this is likely to be the preferred port of entry into the labor markets for the youngsters 
after completing a cycle of superior studies, as also confirmed by the negative impact of age. The fact 
of working in Bologna, capital town of the region, affects positively the risk in all categories but in jobs 
on call, for which instead a specific sector specific pattern emerges in Trade & Tourism. Jobs on call 
are typically exploited during the summer season on the coastal areas (Rimini, Riccione, etc..) while 
those working in the same sector in Bologna are not subjected to such a strong seasonality effect and 
are likely taken in with other contractual agreements. Open-ended contracts have a positive risk of 
being adopted over fixed term contracts in the services and  industry sectors: the risk over a fixed term 
is more than double.  
The typical agency worker has more chances in the industrial sectors than in any other sector (3.84); 
traineeships are more frequent in services (for high skilled, managerial and professional positions). 
Teachers and instructors, isolated from the other services to proxy for the role of the public 
administration (as teachers are basically all public employees) have a positive risk of being hired as 
parasubordinate workers with respect to fixed term, but the risk is otherwise negative for the other 
contractual forms, and while other contractual forms are simply irrelevant for teachers (who do not 
enter the domestic labor market, for instance, nor do apprenticeships) the negative effect is relevant 
with when assessing the open-ended contracts too. This can be interpreted in the light of the 
progressive de-stabilization of the teacher contractual type, once considered a sort of safe haven against 
unemployment – as all teachers were basically taken in with fixed term contracts. This is a meaningful 
episode that confirms the increase perception of uncertainty detected by the ESS data, as baseline, 
stable type of jobs, simply do not exist anymore in that sector, or decrease in importance through time. 
When considering the first contract, 51% of workers in the education sector were hired through a fixed 
term contract, 24% as parasubordinate workers and 21% with open-ended contracts. Teachers 
represent over 60% of workers hired in the education sector, and half of them are hired through fixed 
term contracts.  
A second specification of the model concerns the second contract observed in the data, provided it 
does not overlap with the previous one. We evaluate the likelihood of observing a given type of 
contract in the agreement following the first one, given the initial contractual type. This provides us 
with a range of probabilities of transition from a contractual form (all types) to a different job, or to the 
same as the previous one, as a partial answer to the question if any given contractual agreement is likely 
to lead to a permanent job position, or act efficiently as a stepping-stone or rather a dead-end. The 
analysis should also be completed with an analysis of those individuals who do not get a contract at all 
after the first one, given similar characteristics of those who instead get one. This further possible 
investigation will be discussed at the end of this study.  
Unfortunately, at the time being we do not have the information on the employment/not in 
employment status for those individuals who conclude a contract and disappear, since workers are only 
observed when entering and exiting a contract. Therefore we can only assume they have been looking 
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for a job until they find one, apart from the subjects that appear once in our time span, and then 
disappear (as for the cases of people retiring).  
As mentioned before, under this second empirical investigation, we only focus on open-ended 
contracts, fixed term contracts, parasubordinate contracts (as those are basically formally independent 
workers, but often engaged in long term collaborations)5, apprenticeships (as the typical port of entry 
into the dependent labor world), and temporary agency workers (as one of the most investigated case in 
the literature over the stepping stone hypothesis). The results of this second specification, limited to the 
relative risks for open-ended contracts are reported in Table 5. 
 
                                                          
5We partially followed the choice adopted in the Rapporto Ervet on the Labor Market (2015), where the aggregation of the 
“proper” dependent labor concerned open-ended contracts, fixed term contracts, apprenticeships, and temporary agency 
workers. We opted for retaining in this study the parasubordinate workers since the weight of parasubordinate workers 
among the first contractual agreement observed is over 7%, and remains stable in the second contractual agreements 
observed, larger than the slightly more than 6% of temporary agency workers; even from the taxation point of view, they are 
assimilated to dependent workers in Italy since 2001, with the same personal income tax and employees' social security 
contributions.  
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Table 5. Multinomial logit. Determinants of contractual types given the first contractual type, open-ended contracts as second contract. 
A. Full database   Number of observations 289974 B.Conditioning on apprenticeships   Number of observations 17006 
  
 
LR chi(48)) 
 
124532   
  
LR chi(48)) 4338.04 
  
 
Prob > chi2 
 
0.000   
  
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -302954.54 Pseudo R2 
 
0.1705 Log likelihood = -20913.403 
 
Pseudo R2 0.094 
Base outcome: fixed-term contracts 
   
  Base outcome: fixed-term contracts 
  
  
  
 
Relative-risk 
ratio 
Std. Error z P>|z|   
 
Relative-
risk ratio 
Std. Error z P>|z| 
Open ended contracts 
   
  Open ended contracts 
   
  
  Age 1.14 0.03 48.49 0.0000   Age 1.27 0.025 12.15 0.000 
  Age^2 0.99 0.00 -47.83 0.0000   Age^2 0.996 0 -10.19 0.000 
  Female 0.69 0.01 -36.3 0.0000   Female 0.83 0.041 -3.6 0.000 
  Foreign 0.91 0.01 -7.61 0.0000   Foreign 0.89 0.051 -2 0.046 
  University degree 1.18 0.02 8.26 0.0000   University degree 1.01 0.153 0.07 0.947 
  Bologna 1.30 0.14 24.16 0.0000   Bologna 1.16 0.065 2.7 0.007 
  Agriculture 0.08 0.04 -48.49 0.0000   Agriculture 0.08 0.023 -8.58 0.000 
  Trade & Tourism 1.50 0.01 11.63 0.0000   Trade & Tourism 1.01 0.185 0.09 0.924 
  Constructions 2.37 0.09 23.23 0.0000   Constructions 2.04 0.39 3.73 0.000 
  Industry 2.92 0.10 30.73 0.0000   Industry 2.149 0.39 4.17 0.000 
  Education 1.09 0.04 2.46 0.0140   Education 0.379 0.14 -2.56 0.011 
  Services 3.28 0.11 34.58 0.0000   Services 1.77 0.32 3.15 0.002 
  constant  0.02 0.00 -58.22 0.0000   constant  0.112 0.003 -13.26 0.000 
Predicted CTI Mean 27.9%       Predicted CTI Mean 20.4%       
C. Conditioning on open ended contracts Number of observations 62874 D. Conditioning on parasubordinates Number of observations 25117 
  
 
LR chi(48)) 
 
9146.52   
  
LR chi(48)) 5916.59 
  
 
Prob > chi2 
 
0.000   
  
Prob > chi2 0 
Log likelihood = -53096.874 Pseudo R2 
 
0.0793 Log likelihood = -22743.285 
 
Pseudo R2 0.1151 
Base outcome: fixed-term contracts 
   
  Base outcome: fixed-term contracts 
  
  
  
 
Relative-risk 
ratio 
Std. Error z P>|z|   
 
Relative-
risk ratio 
Std. Error z P>|z| 
Open ended contracts 
   
  Open ended contracts 
   
  
  Age 1.05 0.00 8.11 0.000   Age 1.11 0.016 7.47 0.000 
  Age^2 0.99 0.00 -7.47 0.000   Age^2 0.99 0.000 -6.94 0.000 
  Female 1 0.02 0.15 0.878   Female 0.74 0.035 -6.13 0.000 
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  Foreign 0.75 0.02 -12.74 0.000   Foreign 0.88 0.065 -1.63 0.103 
  University degree 1.44 0.07 7.11 0.000   University degree 0.93 0.070 -0.85 0.394 
  Bologna 1.1 0.02 4.58 0.000   Bologna 1.11 0.055 2.24 0.025 
  Agriculture 0.172 0.02 -18.09 0.000   Agriculture 0.15 0.044 -6.61 0.000 
  Trade & Tourism 1.03 0.08 0.45 0.656   Trade & Tourism 0.85 0.150 -0.87 0.386 
  Constructions 0.99 0.08 -0.06 0.953   Constructions 0.96 0.190 -0.2 0.844 
  Industry 1.86 0.14 8.16 0.000   Industry 1.38 0.250 1.81 0.070 
  Education 3.92 0.39 13.56 0.000   Education 0.86 0.160 -0.74 0.457 
  Services 1.95 0.14 8.87 0.000   Services 1.29 0.220 1.5 0.133 
  constant  0.62 0.09 -3.13 0.002   constant  0.115 0.036 -6.83 0.000 
Predicted CTI Mean 66.9%       Predicted CTI Mean 14.5%       
E. Conditioning on fixed term contracts       147367 F. Conditioning on temporary workers Number of observations 26,234 
  
    
36776.27   
  
LR chi(48)) 5279.66 
  
    
0.0000   
  
Prob > chi2 0 
Log likelihood = -103270.97 
   
0.1511 Log likelihood = -30467.509 
 
Pseudo R2 0.0797 
Base outcome: fixed-term contracts 
   
  Base outcome: fixed-term contracts 
  
  
  
 
Relative-risk 
ratio 
Std. Error z P>|z|   
 
Relative-
risk ratio 
Std. Error z P>|z| 
Open ended contracts 
   
  Open ended contracts 
   
  
  Age 1.13 0.005 26.28 0.000   Age 1.04 0.014 2.98 0.0030 
  Age^2 0.99 0 -28.05 0.000   Age^2 0.99 0 -3.1 0.0020 
  Female 0.81 0.013 -12.78 0.000   Female 0.83 0.323 -4.56 0.0000 
  Foreign 0.91 0.016 -4.83 0.000   Foreign 0.92 0.042 -1.66 0.0980 
  University degree 1.05 0.036 1.59 0.111   University degree 0.95 0.076 -0.53 0.5930 
  Bologna 1.31 0.023 15.22 0.000   Bologna 0.95 0.039 -1.1 0.2700 
  Agriculture 0.1 0.008 -29.19 0.000   Agriculture 0.061 0.017 -9.71 0.0000 
  Trade & Tourism 1.58 0.087 8.23 0.000   Trade & Tourism 0.9 0.125 -0.73 0.4640 
  Constructions 2.78 0.164 17.27 0.000   Constructions 1.37 0.216 1.99 0.0460 
  Industry 2.38 0.133 15.55 0.000   Industry 1.5 0.203 2.99 0.0030 
  Education 1.01 0.616 0.19 0.848   Education 0.173 0.068 -4.45 0.0000 
  Services 3.24 0.177 21.49 0.000   Services 1.34 0.184 2.19 0.0280 
  constant  0.01 0.001 -39.84 0.000   constant  0.32 0.087 -4.19 0.0000 
Predicted CTI Mean 15.9%       Predicted CTI Mean 19.8%       
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Table 5 reports six panels. Panel A contains estimates for all the population of individuals with a 
second a contract (even if only the effect for those with an open-ended as a second contract is shown 
here). The other panels condition on a selected type for the first contract. Therefore, the first panel can 
be considered as a baseline for the other estimations.  
As before, estimated coefficients are relative-risk ratios, and the threshold for interpretation, although 
quite complicate (Greene, 2011), is represented by the value “1”, as all coefficients larger than 1 mean 
that the risk of being observed lies with the current outcome with respect to the base outcome, and 
vice-versa. Age always represent a plus when evaluating the probability of observing an open-ended 
contract after a first contract of any kind, but the effect is stronger when the first contract observed 
was an apprenticeship contract.  Age squared increased the performance of the specification, but the 
value always ranges around the value of 1, meaning probably that experience in itself is not a key 
determinant in the type of the second contract. Being female is never an asset, as the risk of an open-
ended contract always decreases if the worker is a woman (with respect to the base outcome, fixed 
term). Only in the case the first contract was an open-ended contract, being female has a neutral 
impact. In all other cases but this last, even being a foreign worker gives more chance to get an open-
ended contract than being a woman. Having a university degree always leads to higher probability of 
getting a open-ended contract, but for the case in which the previous contract was a temporary agency 
contract. The probability is especially high (1.44) in the case also the previous contract was an open-
ended contract. This same pattern is reflected in jobs undertaken in the capital, Bologna. Construction, 
Trade and Tourism, and Industry are those sectors where the risk of ending up with an open-ended 
contract is higher, no matter the first contract. For the Education sector, the risk is much stronger in 
case the previous contract was another open-ended contract.  
We are particularly interested in the predicted value for open-ended contracts stemming from the 
estimation. In panel A, the predicted value is 27.9%. This corresponds to the real percentage of 
individuals with an open-ended as second contract in the population, or in other words, the model 
exhibits enough terms to fully explain the effective percentage of individuals with an open-ended as 
second contract; the model is said to be fully saturated.  
When we move to the other panels, we find different predictions. In particular, we have 66.9% 
probability of observing an open-ended contract if the previous was open-ended as well. No prediction 
is higher, therefore we can conclude that no situation is better than this to expect a second open-ended 
contract. What about the other previous contractual forms? If we were looking for some stepping stone 
effect, we could compare the same values when observing other contractual forms. And if we were 
asked about fixed term contracts as a stepping stone to open-ended contract, the answer would be a 
clear “no”. Actually, only parasubordinates workers perform (marginally) worse than fixed term 
contracts in increasing the probability of getting an open-ended contract (14.5% versus 15.9%). The 
best predictor is the apprenticeship contract (20.4%) followed by the temporary agency contract 
(19.8%). All in all, no stepping stone is observable from this preliminary analysis, as none of the 
categories observed performs better than the baseline outcome in panel A, but the very open-ended 
contract itself, hinting for the presence of a strong hysteresis (trapping effect), rather than a stepping 
stone effect. 
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4.2. Sequential analysis 
 
Sequences are entities built by a limited number of elements that are ordered in a specific way. A typical 
example is human DNA, where the elements adenine, cytosine, guanine, and thymine (the organic 
bases) are ordered into a sequence. Other sequences are songs that are built by tones that appear in a 
specific order, or careers of employers that are built by specific job positions and ordered along time. 
This sequential technique6 allows for tabulating those sequences that appear more frequently in the 
data. In this analysis, we also retained the overlapping contracts, but contracts were ordered 
chronologically – logically anyway. The first contract is always the first one observed in 2008 and the 
time span is always 2008 -2012. We present here the 24 most frequent types of sequences of contractual 
agreements. We find that the workers with only one open-ended contract are the most frequent 
(18.53%), followed by those workers with only one fixed – term contract (13.91%); the third most 
frequent sequence is the one with fixed-term contracts (4.88%), followed by those workers with two 
open-ended contracts (4.79%). The fifth most frequent sequence is the one with five fixed term 
contracts. The results for the first 24 sequences are reported in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Most common sequences of contractual agreements 
Frequence Sequences of contractual agreements (top 24, 71.35% of workers) 
18.53 CTI 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
13.91 CTD 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
4.88 CTD 
 
CTD 
 
  
 
  
 
  
4.79 CTI 
 
CTI 
 
  
 
  
 
  
4.48 CTD 
 
CTD 
 
CTD 
 
CTD 
 
CTD 
2.93 LPAR 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
2.79 CTD 
 
CTD 
 
CTD 
 
  
 
  
2.72 CTD 
 
CTI 
 
  
 
  
 
  
2.12 CTD 
 
CTD 
 
CTD 
 
CTD 
 
  
1.79 CAI 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
1.55 SOM 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
1.36 LDOM 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
1.31 CTI 
 
CTI 
 
CTI 
 
  
 
  
1.23 CTD 
 
CTD 
 
CTI 
 
  
 
  
1.01 CTI 
 
CTD 
 
  
 
  
 
  
1.01 LPAR 
 
LPAR 
 
  
 
  
 
  
0.91 CTD 
 
CTD 
 
CTD 
 
CTI 
 
  
0.68 LINT 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
0.65 LDOM 
 
LDOM 
 
  
 
  
 
  
0.64 SOM 
 
CTI 
 
  
 
  
 
  
0.54 LPAR 
 
LPAR 
 
  
 
  
 
  
0.52 CTD 
 
CTI 
 
CTI 
 
  
 
  
                                                          
6 The routine command is an extension package for Stata developed by Ulrich Kohler, Christian Brzinsky-Fay and 
Magdalena Luniak, http://www.stata.com/statalist/archive/2006-08/msg00186.html   
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0.5 SOM 
 
SOM 
 
  
 
  
 
  
0.5 CTD   LINT             
 
A second sequencing allowed for mapping the most common sequences by sector of economic activity. 
Table 7 reports as those individuals with only one contract are concentrated in the Services (15.25%) 
followed by Industry (9.75%) and Trade and Tourism (8.65%).  
 
Table 7. Most common sequences of economic sectors 
Frequence Top 17 (about 70% of workers) 
15.25 Services                 
9.75 Industry  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
8.65 Trade & Tourism  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
6.72 Services  
Services 
 
  
 
  
 
  
4.13 Construction  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
3.58 Trade & Tourism  
Trade & Tourism 
 
  
 
  
 
  
3.58 Industry  
Industry 
 
  
 
  
 
  
3.52 Services  
Services 
 
Services 
 
  
 
  
2.54 Agricolture  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
2.01 Services  
Services 
 
Services 
 
Services 
 
  
2 Trade & Tourism  
Trade & Tourism 
 
Trade & Tourism 
 
  
 
  
1.88 Agricolture  
Agricolture 
 
Agricolture 
 
Agricolture 
 
  
1.69 Education  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
1.65 Industry  
Industry 
 
Industry 
 
  
 
  
1.36 Services  
Services 
 
Services 
 
Services 
 
Services 
1.3 Trade & Tourism  
Trade & Tourism 
 
Trade & Tourism 
 
Trade & Tourism 
 
  
1.28 Construction   Construction             
 
The most fragmented sectors in terms of number of contracts per person seems to be the Services 
sector, the first to appear in the top 17 with three, four and five contracts. Also, a noticeable feature of 
this table is that changing sector of economic activity simply is not popular. People tend to remain in 
the economic branch, while perhaps changing the type of contractual agreement. 
5. Conclusions and future research 
 
In this study we took inspiration from the ESS data for Emilia Romagna and investigated into the 
nature of the working life of its inhabitants in the 2008-2012 time span. In particular, we considered 
those ESS data, in 2002 and 2012, which showed a growing uncertainty in people’s life with respect to 
job conditions, perceived as weakening and worsening through time. We therefore ran some analyses of 
the dependent labor data coming from the SILER database, the proprietary database collecting the 
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movements of dependent labor elaborated from the administrative data called C.O. (Comunicazioni 
Obbligatorie). The statistics present a universe where uncertainty is growing and the weight of 
temporary, fixed term and atypical jobs is increasing, although the majority of workers do still have 
permanent job positions. We investigated about contract durations and length of non-employment 
between one contract and the other. These data can be used to find some of the debated “stepping-
stone” effect of temporary jobs towards more stable working agreements. We started by measuring the 
relative efficiency of transition from various contractual agreements into open-ended jobs, to find out 
that the widely adopted “fixed term” agreement is the less conducive to permanent job positions. So, a 
hint for some kind of “entrapping”  already emerged from the statistical analysis. 
We subsequently performed a multinomial logit analysis of the first and second contract observed for 
the workers of our sample, to assess the relative effect that each individual and external characteristics 
have on the likelihood of observing a given contractual type, both in absolute terms (observing just the 
first contract) and controlling for the first contractual agreement observed. We foundn that women are 
always in disadvantage with respect to men, as well as foreigners, but in the domestic labor agreements. 
We found also that rather than being a stepping stone, most contractual forms, and especially the fixed 
term contract, act as traps. This effect is found in the related literature,(as well as its contrary) and to 
investigate its robustness to model specifications, a further research should turn to different 
methodologies (as the propensity score analysis and/or the dynamic panel data analysis). 
Furthermore, the data allowed us to reconstruct the more common sequences of contractual 
agreements and the most frequent sector of economy activity alternations. We found that, while 
transitions into different contractual agreements is common, (apart from the trapping effect embedded 
into the fixed term contracts) workers do not change sectors of economic activity.  
More research on the stepping stone hypothesis will be based also on the observation of the employer, 
since stabilization of workers often passes through different contracts granted to the same workers, in 
the case temporary jobs were used a screening devices. 
Major institutional changes can also be evaluated in terms of impact on the labor market, as the Jobs 
Act in Italy in 2015 (although some recent evidence has already been discussed). 
Another stream of research will depart from the above most popular theme to concentrate of the 
impact of temporary jobs on firms productivity. This field is relatively unexplored yet and a number of 
research questions can be addressed, that could for instance provide a further support from the broad 
interpretation of the change in the European social context offered by the ESS data.  
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Appendix 
Reclassification of labor contractual agreements. 
 
Codes Description 
CTI – Open-ended contracts Open-ended contracts 
Open-ended dependent labor in the public administration 
Open-ended job sharing 
Open-ended domestic labor 
Open-ended labor in the Arts&Show sector 
Maritime open-ended contracts 
CAI – Apprenticeships contracts Apprenticeship leading to a profession 
Apprenticeship to fulfill the duty-responsibility of 
education/training 
Apprenticeship to obtain a diploma or higher education programs 
Apprenticeship as per art.16. Law 196/97. 
Access to work contracts 
Contracts for line-up type a1 
Porting 
CTD – Fixed term contracts Fixed term contracts 
Fixed term dependent labor in the public administration 
Fixed term job sharing 
Fixed term labor in the Arts&Show sector 
Maritime fixed term contracts 
Fixed term contracts for substitution 
Fixed term contracts in Agricolture 
SOM – Temporary agency work Open-ended temporary agency work 
Fixed term temporary agency work 
LINT – Jobs on call  Open-ended jobs on call 
Fixed term jobs on call 
LDOM – Domestic labor Open-ended domestic labor 
Fixed term domestic labor 
LPAR – Parasubordinate work Project contracts/ continued and coordinated collaboration 
Casual work 
Open-ended association in participation  
Fixed term association in participation 
Autonomous work in the Arts&Show sector 
Open-ended agency contracts 
Fixed term agency contracts 
ELAV – Traineeships Traineeships, internships 
Community service 
 
 
 
